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Liability of a Mother Company for Its Subsidiary in French,
Belgian, and English Law
SIEL DEMEYERE*
Abstract: Multinational enterprises can go unpunished for acts, even amounting to
human rights violations, that are committed in developing countries. Because the
subsidiary has committed these acts, the mother company itself escapes liability. In
this article, we will analyse how one can nevertheless react against acts of subsidiaries
abroad. We will study the possibility of liability in tort and the grounds for piercing
the corporate veil in French, Belgian, and English law. We then make a comparison
with the economic unity argument in competition law. As these arguments are based
on French, Belgian, and English law, we will first shortly discuss how the application
of such laws can be ensured and how jurisdiction of courts within the EU can be
established.
Résumé: Des entreprises multinationales peuvent rester impunies pour des actes,
élevants à des violations des droits humains, qui sont commis dans des pays à
développement. Parce que c’est la filiale qui a commis ces actes, la société mère
elle-même n’est pas responsable. Dans cette contribution, on analyse comment on
peut réagir contre des actes d’une filiale à l’étranger. On étudie la responsabilité
extracontractuelle et les bases pour lever le voile social en droit français, belge et
anglais. Après, on fait une comparaison avec l’argument d’unité économique en droit
de concurrence. Comme tous ces arguments sont basés sur le droit français, belge et
anglais, on discute d’abord brièvement comment on peut assurer qu’un de ces lois soit
applicable et qu’un tribunal européen soit compétent.
Zusammenfassung: Multinationale Unternehmen werden regelmäßig nicht für
Handlungen bestraft – selbst wenn es sich um Menschenrechtsverletzungen handelt –
die in Entwicklungsländer begangen wurden. Weil eine Tochtergesellschaft diese
Handlungen vorgenommen hat, entgeht der Mutterkonzern einer Haftung. Im
vorliegenden Beitrag wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie man auf solche Handlungen
von Tochtergesellschaften im Ausland rechtlich reagieren kann. Wir werden die
Möglichkeit einer deliktsrechtlichen Haftung aufzeigen und die Gründe für eine
Durchbrechung der Haftungsbegrenzung im französischen, belgischen und englischen
Recht untersuchen. Wir werden dann einen Vergleich hinsichtlich des Argumentes der
ökonomischen Einheit im Wettbewerbsrecht vornehmen. Da diese Argumente auf dem
französischen, belgischen und englischen Recht beruhen, werden wir vorab
untersuchen wie die Anwendung dieser Rechte gesichert und eine Zuständigkeit von
Gerichten innerhalb der EU geschaffen werden kann.
* PhD researcher at KU Leuven and Université Lille 2. Many thanks to Professor Geert Van Calster
under whose supervision the paper on which this article is based has been written.
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1. Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) set up corporate groups and benefit from these
structures, often with a view to limiting liability for the practices of their
subsidiaries. Especially when the subsidiaries are located in less developed
countries, human rights violations and labour conditions bordering slavery can go
unpunished.1 The victims of these acts, who we will also call ‘involuntary
creditors’, are mostly employees of the subsidiary and local population of the host
country. Because of this impunity, they should attempt to establish the liability of
the mother company, assumingly domiciled within the EU, in order to ensure a
fair handling of their case and the application of a full-fledged body of law.
Although this might be decried as forum shopping, the mother companies
eventually benefit from the corporate structure they set up, so it is logical to (try
to) hold them liable. Moreover, the mother companies definitely go forum
shopping when they choose a country to set up a subsidiary, so why should the
victims of these practices not be allowed to do the same?
The globalization and emergence of MNEs have urged the need to contain
the practices of these companies.2 However, little attention has gone to the
inability of European countries to ensure the respect for human rights and the
environment by MNEs that have a link with Europe.3 Recently, several
international and supranational organizations, such as the EU, the Council of
Europe, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the UN, have attempted
to take corporate social responsibility to a higher level,4 although none of their
1 See extensively, on the problem of impunity, O. DE SCHUTTER, ‘The Accountability of
Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law’, in Non-State Actors and Human
Rights, ed. P. Alston (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), pp 227–314.
2 See, for instance, the following recent case on the alleged slavery organized by prawn fishing
companies: K. HODAL, C. KELLY & F. LAWRENCE, ‘Revealed: Asian Slave Labour Producing Prawns
for Supermarkets in US, UK’, 10 Jun. 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
2014/jun/10/supermarket-prawns-thailand-produced-slave-labour (consulted on 15 Jun. 2014).
3 Despite the attention that the Institut de Droit International tried to draw to this problem in 1995
already. See INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, ‘Obligations of Multinational Enterprises and their
Member Companies’, 1 Sep. 1995, http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/navig_chon1993.html.
4 Resolution of European Parliament No. 2013/2638(RSP) on labour conditions and health and
safety standards following the recent factory fires and building collapse in Bangladesh; Resolution
of the European Parliament COM (2001) 366 on the Commission Green Paper on promoting a
European framework for corporate social responsibility; STEERING COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
Preliminary Draft Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (CDDH(2013)014), 30 May 2013; Tripartite
Declaration of the International Labour Organization of principles concerning multinational
enterprises and social policy (MNE Declaration), 4th edn, 1 Jan. 2006; J. RUGGIE, Report of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises – Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
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instruments are binding upon countries or companies.5 Still, no country is willing
to assume jurisdiction over corporate social responsibility (CSR) cases or to enact
a victim friendly substantive law. Nothing seems to prevent the MNEs from using
the limitation of their liability as a source of profits.6
We will study what possibilities there are under current English, French,
and Belgian laws to hold a mother company, domiciled in the EU, liable for the
acts of its subsidiary. The need to establish liability of the mother company will be
most urgent in case of a non-EU subsidiary, established in a country without a
full-fledged and good-working body of law.7 Lastly, we will look at the concept of
undertaking in competition law. Of course, this law will not be of direct help to
the claimants we envisage, but it is worth to be discussed because of the interest it
attaches to corporate groups and the similarities between victims of practices of
subsidiaries and victims of competition law violations.
Limited liability was initially set up to protect the natural persons behind
the company.8 This ratio has no relevance in a company group where only
companies, and no natural persons, are behind a subsidiary. Setting up a
subsidiary often does not involve a new risky investment but is a mere
restructuring of existing activities.9 It is likely that in a corporate group, the
interest of certain companies will be subordinate to the well-being of the whole
Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 21 Mar. 2011,
http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Protect-Respect-Remedy-Frame
work/GuidingPrinciples.
5 See, on several of these instruments, R. MULLERAT (ed.), Corporate Social Responsibility – The
Corporate Governance of the 21st Century (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2011).
6 V. THOMAS, ‘La responsabilité de la société mère pour faute dans l’exercice du pouvoir de
contrôle de la filiale’, Rev. Proc. Coll. (Revue des Procédures Collectives) 2013, nr. 6, dossier 55,
nr. 3. In England, there is even said to be ‘a historic tendency for companies to take advantage of
the concept of separate corporate liability in order to arrange their group affairs so as to
compartmentalise liabilities’. See P. HUGHES, ‘Competition Law Enforcement and Corporate
Group Liability – Adjusting the Veil’, ECLR (European Competition Law Review) 2014, p (68)
80.
7 The deficiencies in the law can be due to the inability to develop a good-working law, e.g.,
because of other priorities, such as the satisfaction of primary needs. We can, for instance, think
of access to water and the fight against plagues. The local authorities might not only be unable
but also unwilling to address these problems because of their courtesy towards MNEs or even
their corruptness.
8 C.M. BRÜLS, ‘Quelques réflexions juridiques et économique sur la théorie de la levée du voile
social’, RPS (Revue Pratique des Sociétés Civiles et Commerciales) 2004, p (303) 314; P. HUGHES,
35(2). ECLR 2014, p 75; P. MUCHLINSKI, ‘The Company Law Review and Multinational
Corporate Groups’, in The Reform of United Kingdom Company Law, ed. J. de Lacy (London:
Cavendish Publishing Ltd 2002), p 266.
9 P. MUCHLINSKI, ‘Corporations in International Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction and the United
Kingdom Asbestos Cases’, ICLQ (International and Comparative Law Quarterly) 2001, p (1) 16,
nr. 50.
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group. Then, it is not per se logical to respect the separateness of the legal
persons.10 Especially when the subsidiary is wholly owned by the mother
company, it is arguable that the subsidiary’s activities should engage the mother’s
liability.11
We will therefore study the different ways to hold a mother company liable
for acts of its subsidiary, except for liability based on insolvency. This immediately
makes one think of the possibilities to pierce the corporate veil. Veil piercing
occurs when ‘the separateness of a corporation [is disregarded] and the
shareholders [are held] liable for the corporation’s actions as if it were the
shareholder’s own’.12 We will refer to all ways of veil piercing as ‘indirect liability
of the mother company’ because the liability of the mother company is established
through a debt of its subsidiary. However, a mother company can be liable for its
own deeds or omissions too. In the latter situation, the corporate veil is crossed,
not pierced,13 and we will refer to this situation as one of ‘direct liability of the
mother company’.
A study of English, French, and Belgian law only makes sense when the
applicability of one of these laws can be ensured, despite the international nature
of the case. In case of indirect liability, a rather complicated conflict of law
question arises.14 This has often led the courts to negate this question and apply
the lex fori, i.e., the law of the country where the case is tried, to the entire
case.15 In case of direct liability, English, French, or Belgian law can be applied
10 B. GRIMONPREZ, ‘Pour une responsabilité des sociétés mères du fait de leurs filiales’, Rev. Soc.
(Revue des Sociétés) 2009, p 715, nr. 4.
11 In such a case, the subsidiary is said to be ‘bound hand and foot to the parent company and must
do just what the parent company says’. See Adams v. Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch. 433, at
534C citing Professor GOWER, Modern Company Law (3rd edn, 1969), p 216.
12 C.M. BRÜLS, RPS 2004, p 303; V. SIMONART, La personnalité morale en droit privé comparé
(Brussels: Bruylant 1995), p 457; K. VANDEKERCKHOVE, Piercing the Corporate Veil (Alphen aan
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2007), p 1.
13 A. SANGER, ‘Crossing the Corporate Veil: The Duty of Care Owed by a Parent Company to the
Employees of its Subsidiary’, CLJ (Consumer Law Journal) 2012, nr. 71(3), pp 478–481.
14 The case can be characterized in view of the claim against the subsidiary or in view of the veil
piercing issue. Because of these two possibilities, dépeçage, i.e., ‘the application of the laws of
different states to different issues in the same case’, could be allowed. See S.C. SYMEONIDES,
‘Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity’, Am. J. Comp. L. (American Journal of
Comparative Law) 2011, p (173) 185. Moreover, the national laws have no clear rule for the law
applicable to veil piercing cases. One can argue for the application of the lex fori, the lex
societatis of the subsidiary or the lex societatis of the mother company.
15 K. VANDEKERCKHOVE, Piercing the Corporate Veil, p 611. In these English, French, and Belgian
cases for instance, there was no consideration as to the applicable law at all: Court of Appeal
(Civil Division) 27 Jul. 1989, Adams v. Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch. 433; Cass. fr. (Com.) 22
Jun. 2009, nr. 98-13.611, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/; Court of Appeal Versailles (Chamber
12) 14 Feb. 1991, De Kluguenau v. Ouizille, www.lexisnexis.com; Court of Appeal (Chamber 2)
Aix-en-Provence 18 Nov. 1993, Société de droit libanais Mohamed Zoatai and Bros v. SA Lemphy
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through Articles 7 and 17 of the Rome II Regulation. Article 7 enables the
application of the lex loci delicti commissi in case of environmental damage.16 The
application of the lex loci delicti commissi will only help us if the decisions that
were taken by the mother company can be taken into account and not only the
behaviour of the subsidiary. Dickinson defines the event giving rise to damage as
‘the event for which the defendant is responsible, whether or not it consists of his
own act or omission’.17 It is acknowledged that several material events or causes
can give rise to the damage. Several loci delicti commissi are thus possible. Otero
argues that the best choice would be for the law of the place where the most
substantial event occurred.18
Article 17 states that the rules of safety and conduct of the place and time
of the event giving rise to the damage should be taken into account. Although this
is less stringent than that they should be applied, the broad interpretation of
Article 17 ensures that that law can determine the liability of the mother company
for a great part.19 When Article 7 or 17 is not relevant to the conflict of law issue,
the applicability of English, French, or Belgian law may be ensured by way of the
public policy exception. In case the application of a foreign law would be contrary
to the public order in which the case is tried, the lex fori can be applied anyway
on the basis of the public policy exception.20 This exception is only rarely
accepted,21 but it may be argued that it is an element of the public order of a
civilized country to hold a mother company liable for the unacceptable behaviour
of its subsidiary.
Maritima Entreprise, www.lexisnexis.com; Court of Appeal Antwerp 1 Feb. 1994, TRV (Tijd-
schrift voor rechtspersoon en vennootschap) 1996, p 64; Court of Appeal Antwerp 12 Dec. 1995,
TRV 1996, p 62; Cass. be. 6 Dec. 1996, C.950260.N, www.cass.be. In these English cases, the
court considered the law to be applied to one issue at stake but did not redo its reasoning for the
veil piercing issue: Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) 25 Feb. 2011, Antonio Gramsci
Shipping Corp v. Stepanovs [2011] EWHC 333 (Comm); Supreme Court 6 Feb. 2013, VTB
Capital Plc v. Nutritek International Corpn and others [2013] UKSC 5.
16 For Art. 7 to apply, the consequence of the event giving rise to damage must be analysed as
environmental, not the event giving rise to damage itself. A. DICKINSON, The Rome II Regulation
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), p 437.
17 Ibid., p 439.
18 C. OTERO GARCIA-CASTRILLON, ‘International Litigation Trends in Environmental Liability: A
European Union – United States Comparative Perspective’, Journal of Private International Law
2011, p (551) 570.
19 A. DICKINSON, The Rome II Regulation, p 640.
20 For the public policy exception in the Rome I and II Regulations, see Art. 21 Rome I Regulation
and Art. 26 Rome II Regulation. For French law, see, e.g., Cass. fr. (1st Civ.) 25 Jan. 1977, nr.
74-13437, Bull. Civ. (Bulletin Civil) 1977, I, nr. 43; Cass. fr. (1st Civ.) 24 Feb. 1998, D. (Dalloz)
1999, somm. 290. For Belgian law, see Art. 21 of the Belgian Code on Private International Law.
For English law, see L. COLLINS (ed.), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, II
(London: Sweet & Maxwell 2006), p 1626.
21 Recital 37 Rome I and Recital 32 Rome II; ECJ 28 Mar. 2000, C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski.
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Establishing the jurisdiction of an EU court is less complicated.22 A claim
against a company domiciled within the EU can, according to (new) Article 4 of
the Brussels I Regulation, be brought in the country of that domicile.23 The
subsidiary can be involved in the proceedings in that country as the claim against
the subsidiary is connected with the claim against the mother company and can
thus be decided upon by the same court.24
We will only discuss the situation of a subsidiary and its mother company.
However, the influence of an MNE on a supplier might be similar to the power
that a mother company has over its subsidiary. Especially when one MNE is the
sole client of the supplier and when the supplier is situated in a less developed
country, abuses by the MNE are easy. Fairly recently, the Dhaka drama has again
brought to light what dramatic consequences poor working situations can have.25
It will be harder to establish the liability of the mother company for a supplier
than for a subsidiary. However, when the companies have a long business
relationship and even more so when the MNE has a code of conduct,26 it might be
possible to hold the MNE responsible for the activities of its supplier.
We will study the liability of a mother company for its subsidiary, but we
will assume that the mother company is not formally appointed as director of its
subsidiary. Due to its influence, however, the mother company might be a de
facto director or shadow director (cf. infra 3.2, Vicarious Liability for these
concepts in English law). We will not thoroughly look into director’s liability. We
also assume that neither the mother company nor the subsidiary is at the verge of
insolvency. We will accordingly not consider the financial grounds for piercing
the corporate veil, such as undercapitalization, asset stripping, and unduly
22 In the United States, claimants try to establish jurisdiction based on the Alien Torts Statute. This
century-old statute has recently drawn a lot of attention but tends to be interpreted restrictively.
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133
S.Ct. 1659 (2013); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014).
23 The concept of domicile contains three equivalent options, namely statutory seat, central
administration, and principal place of business (Art. 63 Brussels I Regulation).
24 See Art. 8(1) Brussels I Regulation in case the subsidiary is domiciled within the EU. When the
subsidiary is domiciled outside the EU, the French, Belgian, or English private international law
is applied; see Art. 42 of the French new Code on Civil Procedure, Art. 9 of the Belgian Code on
Private International Law, and the English Practice Direction, 6 B, para. 3.1(3).
25 A garment factory in Dhaka, Bangladesh collapsed and over 1,000 workers were killed. See, e.g.,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/24/bangladesh-building-collapse-shops-west.
26 Codes of conduct are more and more enacted by MNEs. See, e.g., the efforts made in the Clean
Clothes Campaign, http://www.cleanclothes.org/ and the code of conduct enacted by H&M (with
a Swedish mother company), http://www.google.be/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&
cd=1&ved=0CDMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fabout.hm.com%2Fcontent%2Fdam%2Fhm%2Fab
out%2Fdocuments%2Fen%2FCSR%2Fcodeofconduct%2FCode%2520of%2520Conduct_en.pdf&e
i=KgaDU-ajJomLOPejgOAJ&usg=AFQjCNE7RNLgqGp4Jh23eGsOBR6DK5uy2g&bvm=bv.677202
77,d.ZWU&cad=rja.
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continuing of loss-making activities.27 Nor will we study criminal responsibility of
the mother company as we assume that the activities of the subsidiary or mother
company are not crimes or at least not prosecuted as such.
2. French and Belgian Law
French and Belgian law are especially interesting because they have a generally
permissive tort law. The rules on veil piercing in these countries are not very
elaborate, except for where statutory grounds permit veil piercing in case of
insolvency. Nevertheless, they rely on existing contractual and tortious
arrangements to hold a shareholder liable. Their tort and contract law strongly
resembles as the provisions we will discuss are quasi-unchanged since they have
been enacted in the Code Napoléon. We will discuss them together and refer
explicitly to the one or the other law in case of differences.
In French and Belgian law, the general principle is that each legal person
is autonomous, even when legal persons form a group.28 A company has its own
assets, and shareholders are not liable for more than their contribution.29 This is
also known as the Trennungsprinzip.30 It is acknowledged that these rules,
however, need to be put aside when they would lead to socially unacceptable
outcomes.31 Neither law has specific rules on corporate groups or piercing the
corporate veil,32 despite several attempts to enact such a law in France (the
Cousté proposals).33 The general contract and tort law is applied in order to hold
the shareholders of a company liable.
27 See, e.g., C.M. BRÜLS, RPS 2004, pp 314–316; K. VANDEKERCKHOVE, Piercing the Corporate Veil,
pp 105–379.
28 H. DE WULF (BE), ‘Concernrechterlijke aansprakelijkheid’, in Bestendig handboek vennootschap
en aansprakelijkheid, eds I. Cuypers et al. (Mechelen: Kluwer), loose leaf and www.jura.be, III.
5-4.
29 Article L 223-1 French Code de Commerce and Arts 210 and 437 Belgian Company Code; Cass.
be. 26 May 1978, Pas. (Pasicrisie) 1978, I, p 1108 = RW (Rechtskundig Weekblad) 1978–1979,
p 846, note H. BRAECKMANS; Z. GALLEZ, in C. Brüls (ed.), ‘La responsabilité de la société mère
pour sa filiale: réflexions sur la levée du voile social’, in Les multinationals – Statut et
réglementations (Brussels: Larcier 2013), p 153.
30 M. DAMBRE (BE), ‘De bescherming van de schuldeisers van een dochtervennootschap in het
internationaal privaatrecht’, in Aspecten van de ondernemingsgroepen, eds H. Biron & C. Dauw
(Antwerp: Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen 1989), p 231.
31 J. RONSE & J. LIEVENS (BE), ‘De doorbraakproblematiek’, in Rechten en plichten van moeder- en
dochtervennootschappen, eds H. Biron & C. Dauw (Mechelen: Kluwer 1986), p 163.
32 C.M. BRÜLS (BE), RPS 2004, p 303; H. DE WULF (BE), in: Bestendig handboek vennootschap en
aansprakelijkheid, III.5-2; V. SIMONART, La personnalité morale, p 459; K. VANDEKERCKHOVE,
Piercing the Corporate Veil, p 28.
33 Proposition de loi sur les groupes de sociétiés et la protection des actionnaires et du personnel,
submitted to Parliament on 19 Feb. 1970 (no. 1055) and on 12 Apr. 1973 (no. 52).
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We will first discuss several provisions of tort law: the general Article 1382
and the vicarious liability Article 1384 of the French and Belgian Civil Code. In
Belgium, liability of a shareholder can be established by proving the abuse of
limited liability, an application of the concept of abuse of right. In France, other
legal devices are more popular, such as fraud, concealment, and the creation of
false appearances. We will not discuss the French Rozenblum doctrine on the
basis of which a director should, under certain conditions, refuse to cooperate to
the benefit of the group but to the detriment of his own company.34 Nor will we
discuss the rather easily accepted liability of a mother company in case of
co-emploi. This is the situation in French law in which a mother company is
recognised as the employer, in order to allow the employee to claim, for instance,
his severance pay not only from the subsidiary that is his actual employer but also
from the mother company.35
2.1. Article 1382 Civil Code
According to Article 1382 Civil Code, ‘[any] act whatever of man, which causes
damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it occurred, to compensate it’.36
Article 1383 Civil Code provides the same for negligence causing damage. In
French and Belgian law, a person incurs liability under Article 1382 or Article
1383 when three conditions are fulfilled: a fault, damage, and a causal link
between the fault and the damage. Legal persons are subject to these provisions,
just as natural persons. When a representative of the legal person commits a fault,
it will be imputed to the legal person.37 The term ‘representative’ is interpreted
broadly as it even includes a de facto director.38
The first condition, fault, constitutes of the violation of a statutory rule or
the violation of a duty of care, whether intentional or not.39 When a person does
not act as a reasonably forward-looking and careful person, as a bonus pater
familias, he/she has infringed the duty of care.
34 K. VANDEKERCKHOVE, Piercing the Corporate Veil, pp 227–228.
35 J. PEROTTO & N. MATHEY, ‘La mise en jeu de la responsabilité de la société mère est-elle une
fatalité? – Regard croisés sur les groupes de sociétés et le risque de coemploi’, JCP Social
(Semaine Juridique Edition Social) 2014, p 1262.
36 ‘Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel
il est arrivé, à le réparer.’
37 Cass. fr. (2nd Civ.) 17 Jul. 1967, Bull. Civ. 1967, II, nr. 261; V. SIMONART, La personnalité
morale, p 451.
38 A.P. SCHOONBROOD-WESSELS (FR), ‘Aansprakelijkheid in concernverhoudingen naar Frans recht’,
in Aansprakelijkheid in concernverhoudingen, eds L.G.H.J. Houwen, A.P. Schoonbrood-Wessels &
J.A.W. Schreurs (Deventer: Kluwer 1993), p 437.
39 P. MALINVAUD & D. FENOUILLET (FR), Droit des obligations (Paris: LexisNexis 2012), p 456;
W. VAN GERVEN (BE), Verbintenissenrecht (Leuven: Acco 2006), p 367.
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As the damage will, in most cases, clearly be caused by the subsidiary, it
will not be easy to prove that the mother company has committed a fault as well.
If a mother company has made a statement concerning corporate social
responsibility however, the mother company set the standard for the duty of care
higher for itself. In that case, it will be accepted more easily that it is liable for its
subsidiary’s acts or negligence.40 Apart from this hypothesis, it can be argued that
the mother’s omission to intervene is a fault. When the mother company knew
about the unacceptable acts of its subsidiary and looked the other way, a judge
will be right to decide that the mother company is liable because it did not use its
ability to control to end the unacceptable practices.41 One might even go further
and argue that even if the mother company did not know about the unacceptable
acts, it is liable for omission because it did not follow its subsidiary up closely
enough. The latter two applications of the fault in a company group context come
down to liability as de facto director (dirigeant de fait).42 The mother company
might have assumed the management of its subsidiary and will be liable for faults
it commits in its management.43 When the judge decides whether something
amounted to a fault or not, he must however take into account the policy margin
a director has.44
The damage is the loss of a patrimonial or extra-patrimonial benefit and
can be material or immaterial.45 Proving that this condition is fulfilled will, in
most cases, be the easiest part of proving liability under Article 1382 or 1383
Civil Code.46
The claimant also has to prove the causal link between the fault and the
damage before he/she can recover damages. In French case law and doctrine, it is
not entirely clear whether the causal link must be proven according to the
‘doctrine of effective cause’ or according to the ‘equivalence doctrine’, although a
40 Y. QUEINNEC & M.C. CAILLET, ‘Quels outils juridiques pour une régulation efficace des activités
des sociétés transnationales?’ in Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise transnationale et
globalisation de l’économie, ed. I. Daugareilh (Brussels: Bruylant 2010), p 654; I. DESBARATS
(FR), ‘La valeur juridique d’un engagement dit socialement responsable’, JCP E (Semaine
juridique édition entreprise) nr. 5, 2 Feb. 2006, p 1214, nr. 20.
41 V. THOMAS (FR), Rev. Proc. Coll. 2013, nr. 13.
42 Z. GALLEZ, Les multinationals – Statut et réglementations, p 163.
43 L. CORNELIS (BE), ‘De aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders van vennootschappen in
groespsverband’, in Aspecten van de ondernemingsgroepen, eds H. Biron & C. Dauw (Antwerp:
Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen 1989), p 166.
44 M. VANDENBOGAERDE (BE), Aansprakelijkheid van vennootschapsbestuurders (Antwerp: Intersentia
2009), p 131.
45 P. MALINVAUD & D. FENOUILLET (FR), Droit des obligations, p 439; W. VAN GERVEN (BE),
Verbintenissenrecht, pp 447 and 454.
46 Y. QUEINNEC & M.C. CAILLET, in: Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise transnationale et
globalisation de l’économie, p 654.
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preference can be discerned for the latter.47 Belgian law clearly adheres to the
‘equivalence doctrine’.48 This means that there is a causal link whenever the fault
has contributed to the existence of the damage. The ‘doctrine of effective cause’ is
more stringent, and the causal link will only be accepted when the fault was likely
to cause the damage and actually has played a chief role in causing the damage.
As the ‘equivalence doctrine’ is much more permissive, it will be to the benefit of
the victims if it is applied, which is certain under Belgian law and likely under
French law.
With regard to the causal link, the defendant can escape or reduce liability
by proving that he/she was not the only factor contributing to the existence of the
damage. Force majeure, acts by a third party and a fault of the victim itself can all
break the causal link.49 However, this will not really disadvantage the victims as
whenever the company is partly liable, it is liable in solidum to pay the whole
amount of damages it owes to the victims.50 Only later, it can (try to) claim the
determined amount back from the other persons that are liable.
2.2. Article 1384 Civil Code: Vicarious Liability for Employees
In both French and Belgian laws, a person is not only liable for its own acts or
omissions but also for the acts and omissions by his/her appointee(s) (préposé).
Article 1384, 3rd limb for Belgian law and Article 1384, 5th limb Civil Code for
French law state that ‘masters and employers [are liable] for the damage caused
by their servants and employees in the functions for which they have been
employed’.51 An employer or any other ‘appointer’ is thus liable for a fault
committed by his employees, or ‘appointees’, while employees themselves will
only rarely be liable.52 Article 1384 was enacted to ensure that a victim can claim
damages from a solvent person. The ‘master’ plays a guaranteeing role.53 This
ratio is definitely valid for liability in group law.
47 Ibid., p 655; P. MALINVAUD & D. FENOUILLET, Droit des obligations, p 542.
48 W. VAN GERVEN, Verbintenissenrecht, p 417.
49 P. MALINVAUD & D. FENOUILLET (FR), Droit des obligations, p 547; W. VAN GERVEN (BE),
Verbintenissenrecht, p 430 ff.
50 Cass. fr. 11 Jul. 1892, D. 1894, I, p 561 = S. (Sirey) 1892, I, p 505; Cass. be. 10 Jul. 1952, Pas.
1952, I, p 738 = Arr.Cass. (Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie) 1952, p 650; P. LE TOURNEAU
(FR), Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats (Paris: Dalloz 2012), p 664; W. VAN GERVEN (BE),
Verbintenissenrecht, p 555.
51 ‘Les maîtres et les commettants [sont responsables] du dommage causé par leurs domestiques et
préposés dans les fonctions auxquelles ils les ont employés’.
52 See Art. 18 Belgian Employment Contracts Law (law of 3 Jul. 1978): the employee will only be
liable for fraud, his culpa lata, and his not accidental culpa levis. In French law, an employee will
only be personally liable when he exceeds the limit of his job function in committing a fault. See
Cass. fr. (Com.) 12 Oct. 1993, nr. 91-10864, Bull. 1993, IV, nr. 338.
53 P. MALINVAUD & D. FENOUILLET (FR), Droit des obligations, pp 473–474.
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A mother company will, however, generally not be liable for any fault
committed by its subsidiary as the latter is not regarded as the appointee of the
mother company, although some authors argue so.54 However, a director of the
subsidiary can, at the same time, be an employee of the mother company, in
which case the mother company can be vicariously liable for its employee. It can
also be argued that the director is appointed by the mother company even if
he/she is not an employee in the strict sense. In this case, it is not imaginary that
a fault of the director will engage the liability of the mother company on the basis
of Article 1384 Civil Code.55
To engage the liability of the employer, both in French and Belgian law,
three conditions have to be fulfilled. First, there has to be a bond of subordination
or appointment.56 The employee is not only socially or economically dependent,
but the employer has the right to give orders and instructions, although he need
not exercise this right.57 It might be so that the employee is granted considerable
freedom to act and it is not even required that the employee acted in accordance
with the instructions of the employer.58 The first condition is even fulfilled when
the defendant has, in the eyes of a reasonable third party, created the appearance
that he/she has the right to give orders and instructions.59 A labour contract is
not required, nor need there be any wage for the employee.60 Second, the
employee has committed a fault as defined in Articles 1382 and 1383 Civil Code,
although the liability of the employee himself must not be established.61 The third
and last condition is that the employee has caused the damage while exercising
his/her function.62 A mother company will probably argue that the person that
caused the damage only exercised his function in the subsidiary and not the
function he/she has for the mother company. However, the last condition is
interpreted particularly broad and it is enough that the damage would not be
54 See, e.g., Y. QUEINNEC & M.C. CAILLET, in: Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise transnationale et
globalisation de l’économie, pp 652–653.
55 B. DE MOOR (BE), ‘Aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders van groepsverbonden vennootschappen’, in
Bestendig handboek vennootschap en aansprakelijkheid, eds I. Cuypers et al. (Mechelen: Kluwer),
loose leaf and www.jura.be, III.6-37 and III.6-44.
56 Ibid., p 483.
57 Cass. be. 27 Feb. 1970, Pas. 1970, I, p 565; J. RONSE & J. LIEVENS (BE), in: Rechten en plichten
van moeder-en dochtervennootschappen, p 162.
58 Cass. be. 3 Jan. 2002, C.99.0035.N, AJT (Algemeen juridisch tijdschrift) 2001-02, p 768, note
I. BOONE.
59 W. VAN GERVEN (BE), Verbintenissenrecht, p 390.
60 J. RONSE & J. LIEVENS (BE), in: Rechten en plichten van moeder- en dochtervennootschappen,
p 163.
61 P. MALINVAUD & D. FENOUILLET (FR), Droit des obligations, pp 484–485; W. VAN GERVEN (BE),
Verbintenissenrecht, p 392.
62 P. MALINVAUD & D. FENOUILLET (FR), Droit des obligations, p 488; W. VAN GERVEN (BE),
Verbintenissenrecht, p 393.
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present in such a way if the subordinate had never been employed.63 Once these
three conditions are fulfilled, the employer has no defence as this provision enacts
a non-rebuttable presumption of liability.64
2.3. Vicarious Liability for Subsidiaries in French Law?
Since the 1990s, French case law interprets the first limb of Article 1384 Civil
Code broadly.65 This provision states that one is not only liable for its own deeds
but also for the deeds of the persons for whom one is answerable. In French law,
a general liability for others is deducted from this phrase (responabilité générale
du fait d’autrui).66 So far, the French courts have only accepted liability for
persons that were charged with supervision over others, such as children and
disabled persons. If the liability of a mother company for deeds of its subsidiary
were to be accepted, it would be much easier to hold the mother company liable
than it currently is under Article 1384, 5th limb French Civil Code.
When a mother company closely follows up all activities of its subsidiary, it
can definitely be argued that the mother company has taken up responsibility for
the deeds of its subsidiary and should be liable according to Article 1384, first
limb.67 Although this has never been accepted by the courts, we could not find
any judgment rejecting such an argument either. More and more cases come into
the scope of the first limb of Article 1384, and the determining criterion seems to
be the authority of one person over another.68 A case decided by the Cour de
Cassation in 2006 will be helpful to argue that a mother company should be
liable. In this case, the court decided that a labour union is not responsible for
what its demonstrating members do because labour unions have ‘not as a goal or
as a mission to organize, direct or control the activity of its members in the
course of movements or manifestations in which the members participate’.69 This
63 See, for instance, Cass. be. 7 Feb. 1969, RW 1968–1969, p 1545. An employer is, for instance,
even liable when his employee causes a traffic accident while driving a company car without a
driver’s licence after his working hours. See Cass. be. 2 Oct. 1984, Arr.Cass. 1984–1985, p 181.
64 P. LE TOURNEAU (FR), Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats, nr. 7555; W. VAN GERVEN (BE),
Verbintenissenrecht, p 389.
65 In Belgian law, the first limb of Art. 1384 is merely seen as an introduction to the more specific
vicarious liabilities determined in limbs two, three, and four.
66 Cass. fr. (Ass. plén.) 29 Mar. 1991, nr. 89-15231, Bull. A.P. 1991, nr. 1; P. LE TOURNEAU, Droit
de la responsabilité et des contrats, nr. 7352; P. MALINVAUD & D. FENOUILLET, Droit des
obligations, p 475.
67 N. MATHEY, ‘La responsabilité sociale des entreprises en matière de droits de l’homme’, JCP E
2010, nr. 3, dossier 13, 2.A.1.
68 P. LE TOURNEAU, Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats, nr. 7359.
69 Cass. fr. (2nd Civ.) 26 Oct. 2006, nr. 04-11665, Bull. Civ. 2006, II, nr. 299 = JCP 2007, II,
10004, note J. MOULY = D. 2007, p 204, note B. LAYDU = LPA 3 Jan. 2007, 15, note M. BRUSORIO
= LPA 23 Jan. 2007, 11, note J.-F. BARBIÈRI = JCP 2007, I, p 115, nr. 5, note PH. STOFFEL-MUNCK
= Rtd. civ. 2007, p 357, note P. JOURDAIN. The original version of this citation is that labour
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motivation can be turned around to argue that a mother company is liable for the
deeds of its subsidiary: if a mother company has as a goal or a mission to
organize, direct, and control the activities of its subsidiary, the mother company
is liable for the deeds of this subsidiary. Already in 1981, Schmidt argued that a
parent company should be liable for the debts of its subsidiary on the sole basis of
the power exercised by the parent in the group.70
Following the 200th anniversary of the French Civil Code, several
initiatives have been taken to rewrite the code. One of these initiatives is the
projet Catala.71 If the latter were to become positive law, liability of mother
companies for the deeds of their subsidiaries will be much easier to establish.
Article 1360, 2nd limb of the projet Catala introduces the liability of a mother
company for all damage caused by its subsidiaries.72 This proposed provision is
subject to the criticism that the basic principles of legal personality are denied.73
It is defended by its enactors as this provision ensures that the real deciders bear
the responsibility and that the victims are better protected.74
2.4. Abuse of Right
The privilege of limited liability is a right that can be abused.75 Especially in
Belgium, creditors of a company rely on the doctrine of abuse of right to hold the
shareholder/mother company liable for the debts of the subsidiary. In France, this
unions have ‘ni pour objet ni pour mission d’organiser, de diriger et de contrôler l’activité de ses
adhérents au cours de mouvements ou manifestations auxquels ces derniers participent’.
70 D. SCHMIDT, ‘La responsabilité civile dans les relations de groupe de sociétés’, Rev. Soc. (Revue
des Sociétés) 1981, pp 736–738.
71 P. CATALA, Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescription (Paris: La
documentation française 2006).
72 Article 1360, limb 2 states that ‘[de] même, est responsable celui qui contrôle l’activité économique
ou patrimoniale d’un professionnel en situation de dépendance, bien qu’agissant pour son propre
compte, lorsque la victime établit que le fait dommageable est en relation avec l’exercice du
contrôle. Il en est ainsi notamment des sociétés mères pour les dommages causés par leurs filiales
[…]’.
73 See, e.g., V. THOMAS, Rev. Proc. Coll. 2013, nr. 3; X, Rapport du groupe de travail de la Cour de
cassation sur l’avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescription, 15 Jun. 2007,
http://www.courdecassation.fr/institution_1/autres_publications_discours_2039/discours_2202/
travail_cour_10699.html, nr. 79.
74 G. VINEY, ‘Sous-titre III – De la responsabilité civile (Articles 1340 à 1386). Exposé des motifs’,
in Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations (Articles 1101 à 1386 du Code civil) et du
droit de la prescription (Articles 2234 à 2281 du Code civil) (2005), www.justice.gouv.fr, p 147.
75 Such abuse was historically based on Arts 544 and 1382 of the Civil Code but is now by some said
to be a general principle of law. See A. DE BOECK, ‘Rechtsmisbruik’, in Bijzondere
Overeenkomsten. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer
(Antwerp: Kluwer 2011), pp 6 and 8–10; P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, Traité de droit civil belge. II. Les
obligations. Vol. 1 (Brussels: Bruylant 2013), p 65, nr. 22 and p 73, nr. 25.
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doctrine exists as well,76 but concealment, fraud, and creation of false
appearances are more relied on to establish the liability of the mother company.
The following is therefore based on Belgian case law and doctrine.
When making use of the doctrine of abuse of right, the claimant first has to
prove that the subsidiary is liable, no matter what the basis for its liability is.
Then, the victim can file a claim against the mother company for abuse of the
privilege of limited liability. If he/she can prove that the mother company does
not earn the privilege of limited liability because it did not respect the rules
concerning the autonomy of the subsidiary, the corporate veil will be pierced.77
However, the threshold for abuse is high as only when the right was exercised in a
way that obviously goes beyond the way it would be exercised by a reasonably
forward-looking and careful person, there is an abuse.78 The case law has pointed
out several indications of abuse, which are not cumulative but need to be
consistent.79 Most indications concern the non-respect for the subsidiary’s
autonomy.80
76 See, e.g., V. CUISINIER, ‘Les groupes et la responsabilité de la société mère’, Rev. Proc. Coll.
2013, nr. 6, dossier 54; N.F. RAAD, L’abus de la personnalité morale en droit privé (Paris:
L.G.D.J. 1991). For an application of this doctrine in France, see on the abuse of a shareholder’s
voting right: Cass. fr. (Com.) 13 Mar. 2001, nr. 98-16.197, Bull. Civ. (Bulletin des arrêts de la
Cour de Cassation. Chambres civiles) 2001, IV, nr. 60 = D. 2001, 1175, note A. LIENHARD =
Dr. Sociétés (Droit des sociétés) 2001, comm. 101, note F.-X. LUCAS = JCP E 2001, 953, note
A. VIANDIER = RTD Com. (Revue trimestrielle de droit commercial) 2001, p 443, note
C. CHAMPAUD & D. DANET = Dr. sociétés 2001, comm. 78, TH. BONNEAU = Rev. Sociétés 2002,
p 818, note B. DONDERO.
77 C.M. BRÜLS, RPS 2004, p 312; L. CORNELIS, in: Aspecten van de ondernemingsgroepen, p 181;
K. GEENS et al., ‘Overzicht van rechtspraak – Vennootschappen 1992–1998’, TPR (Tijdschrift
voor privaatrecht) 2000, p 342; K. GEENS & M. WYCKAERT, Verenigingen en vennootschappen, II
De vennootschap, A. Algemeen deel, in Beginselen van het Belgisch privaatrecht (Mechelen:
Kluwer 2011), p 340; J. RONSE, J.-M. NELISSEN GRADE, K. VAN HULLE, J. LIEVENS & H. LAGA,
‘Overzicht van rechtspraak – Vennootschappen 1978–1985’, TPR 1986, pp 939 and 948–949;
J. RONSE & J. LIEVENS, in: Rechten en plichten van moeder- en dochtervennootschappen, pp 137
and 170; K. VANDEKERCKHOVE, Piercing the Corporate Veil, p 32. A shareholder might have set up
a subsidiary to prevent its creditors from reaching its assets.
78 Cass. be. 10 Mar. 1983, Arr. Cass. 1982–1983, p 847; A. DE BOECK, Rechtsmisbruik (Mechelen:
Kluwer 2011), p 12; K. GEENS & M. WYCKAERT, Verenigingen en vennootschappen, p 343;
J. RONSE et al., ‘Overzicht van rechtspraak – Vennootschappen 1978–1985’, p 949.
79 Cass. be. 11 Sep. 1981, Rev. Prat. Soc. (Revue Pratique des Sociétés) 1982, nr. 6187, p 126 =
BRH (Belgische Rechtspraak in Handelszaken) 1982, p 280 = Pas. 1982, I, p 56; K. GEENS et al.,
‘Overzicht van rechtspraak – Venootschappen 1999–2010’, TPR 2012, p 219; K. GEENS et al.,
‘Overzicht van rechtspraak – Vennootschappen 1992-1998’, p 230; K. GEENS & M. WYCKAERT,
Verenigingen en vennootschappen, p 342.
80 Such as the lack of a division between the assets of the mother company and the subsidiary, no
separate bookkeeping and undercapitalization of the subsidiary. Other indications are the fact
that (almost) all shares of the subsidiary are owned by the mother, the fact that rules concerning
the organs of the subsidiary are not respected, and that in communication with third parties,
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The piercing of the corporate veil is based on the adage Contra proprium
factum nemo venire potest.81 This means that no one may set himself in
contradiction to his/her own previous conduct and it is comparable to estoppel by
conduct. If the judge finds an abuse of right, he will reduce this right to its
normal use.82 This means that there will be no limited liability in as far as there is
abuse. When the reduction of the right to its normal use is no longer possible,
damages will be awarded.83
Proving the fault of the mother company under Article 1382 Civil Code (cf.
supra Article 1382 Civil Code) is a more direct way to get to the mother company
than proving the liability of the subsidiary and the abuse of the privilege of
limited liability by the mother company. It is, however, an extra possibility to hold
the mother company liable, especially when the mother company and subsidiary
are closely intertwined.
2.5. Concealment
While Belgian doctrine mostly relies on the doctrine of abuse of right to pierce
the corporate veil, concealment (simulation), fraud (fraude), and the creation of
false appearances (apparence) play an important role in French law. All these
concepts exist in Belgian law as well, so they can be invoked to hold a mother
company liable.84
There is concealment when parties to a contract intentionally differentiate
between their expressed and actual intentions.85 This is, for instance, the case
when parties agree on a higher price than the one written in their contract in
reference is made to the mother company instead of to the subsidiary, or the fact that decisions
are made to the benefit of the mother company but to the detriment of the subsidiary. The
indications that were before used for the doctrine of undisclosed agency (prête-nom) to extend
insolvency proceedings to the mother company can still be used. On the concepts of disclosed
and undisclosed agency, see D. BUSCH, Middelllijke vertegenwoordiging in het Europese
contractenrecht (Deventer: Kluwer 2002), pp 149–160. On the concept of prête-nom, see I.
SAMOY, Middellijke vertegenwoordiging: vertegenwoordiging herbekeken vanuit het optreden in
eigen naam voor andermans rekening (Antwerp: Intersentia 2005), p 125. On the extension of
insolvency proceedings, see, e.g., H. BRAECKMANS, ‘Toerekening van het
vennootschapsfaillissement aan de achterman of de uitbreiding van het faillissement tot de
meester van de zaak’ (comment on Cass. 26 May 1978), RW 1978–1979, pp 852–854.
81 V. SIMONART, La personnalité morale, pp 534–535; J. RONSE & J. LIEVENS, in: Rechten en plichten
van moeder- en dochtervennootschappen, p 169.
82 Cass. be. 16 Dec. 1982, Pas.1983, I, p 472.
83 A. DE BOECK, in: Bijzondere Overeenkomsten p 20; P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, Traité de droit civil belge,
pp 92–93, nr. 36.
84 See, e.g., Court of Appeal Antwerp 12 Dec. 1995, TRV 1996, p 62; Cass. be. 6 Dec. 1996,
C.950260.N, www.cass.be.
85 P. WÉRY (BE), Droit des obligations, I (Brussels: Larcier 2011), p 877.
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order to avoid taxes. According to Article 1321 Civil Code, third parties can
choose to rely on the consequences of the expressed intentions or on the
consequences of the actual intentions.86
Concealment can be a tool in a company group to organize the insolvency
of a certain company in order to escape from its creditors.87 A company that was
founded with merely this goal is considered a fictitious company (socitété
fictive).88 The company serves to hide the activities of another (natural or legal)
person and none of the shareholders has an affectio societatis.89 The indications of
concealment match to a large extent the indications of abuse of right (cf. supra
Abuse of Right), such as the absence of decent bookkeeping, the malfunction of
organs, and the lack of decision-making power of organs.90 MNEs will, however,
rarely have such a poor administration, but if they have, this can be deployed to
the benefit of the victims of the subsidiary’s practices.
2.6. Fraud
Fraud is another legal basis that is particularly popular in French law to establish
the liability of a mother company. Again, it exists in Belgian law as well,91
although there, another adage is more likely to be applied, namely Nemo contra
factum proprium venire potest (cf. supra Abuse of Right).92 The adage fraus omnia
corrumpit means that no one may invoke his own fraud in order to justify the
application of legal rules to his benefit. Usually the legislator enacts provisions to
prevent that this is possible, but he cannot foresee all situations. The adage is
therefore recognized as a general principle of law (principe général de droit).93
The judiciary will rely on the principle to hold a mother company liable if the
86 K. GEENS & M. WYCKAERT (BE), Verenigingen en vennootschappen, p 326; P. MALINVAUD &
D. FENOUILLET (FR), Droit des obligations, p 227; W. VAN GERVEN (BE), Verbintenissenrecht,
p 878.
87 P. MALINVAUD & D. FENOUILLET (FR), Droit des obligations, p 223.
88 See, e.g., Court of Appeal Bastia 19 Oct. 2011, nr. 10/00457, www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
89 Cass. fr. (Com.) 22 Jun. 1999, nr. 98-13611, Bull. 1999, IV, nr. 136; A.P. SCHOONBROOD-WESSELS
(FR), in: Aansprakelijkheid in concernverhoudingen, pp 472–473.
90 A.P. SCHOONBROOD-WESSELS (FR), in: Aansprakelijkheid in concernverhoudingen, p 474.
91 See A. LENAERTS (BE), ‘Fraus omnia corrumpit: autonome rechtsfiguur of miskend
correctiemechanisme?’, RW 2013–2014, p 362. For the French language version of this text, see
A. LENAERTS (BE), ‘Le principe général du droit fraus omnia corrumpit: une analyse de sa portée
et de sa fonction en droit privé belge’, RGDC (Revue Générale de Droit Civil Belge) 2014, nr. 3,
pp 98–115.
92 K. GEENS & M. WYCKAERT (BE), Verenigingen en vennootschappen, p 342.
93 P. MALINVAUD & D. FENOUILLET (FR), Droit des obligations, p 222; A. LENAERTS (BE), ‘Fraus
omnia corrumpit: autonome rechtsfiguur of miskend correctiemechanisme?’, p 362; P. WÉRY
(BE), Droit des obligations, p 248.
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mother company itself does not respect the legal autonomy of its subsidiary but
invokes it vis-à-vis third parties.
Fraud entails that the company applies faulty behaviour in order to damage
another person.94 The faulty behaviour can consist of a manoeuvre or a violation
of the duty of care. Next to this objective element, there must also be a subjective
element. The company must have applied the behaviour with the intention of
damaging another person.95
Fraud has two potential consequences: the nullity of the whole mechanism
or the impossibility to invoke a certain act (inopposabilité).96 Here, there is no
need to argue for the nullity of the subsidiary. It is sufficient when its existence
cannot be invoked against the victims.
The consequence of fraud and concealment, the fact that the fraudulent act
cannot be invoked against the third party, is exactly the same. The difference lies
in the required proof. To establish fraud, the victims have to prove the intention
to damage another person. For concealment, the proof of the actual intention of
the parties, as opposed to the expressed intention, is required. Proof of fraud is
not necessary to establish liability for concealment.97
2.7. Creation of False Appearances
The last important doctrine in French law to establish the liability of a mother
company is the judge-made theory on creation of false appearances.98 In Belgian
and French law, the legitimate confidence of a third party in a certain situation
can be honoured by forcing the person that created the appearance to live up to
it.99 This is again comparable to estoppel by conduct.
It is rather unlikely that this theory will be relevant when a subsidiary has
caused damage in tort. The damage then just happens to the victim and the victim
did not think about the constellation of the company or group so he/she cannot
have had legitimate confidence in the unity of the group. Even for contractual
creditors, a claim on the basis of creation of false appearances is only accepted in
94 A. LENAERTS, ‘Le principe général du droit fraus omnia corrumpit: une analyse de sa portée et de
sa fonction en droit privé belge’, p (98) 111.
95 Cass. fr. (Com.) 2 Jun. 1987, Bull. Civ. 1987, IV, nr. 132.
96 Cass. fr. (1st Civ.) 4 Dec. 1990, nr. 88-17991, Bull. 1990, I, nr. 278; P. MALINVAUD &
D. FENOUILLET (FR), Droit des obligations, p 222.
97 Cass. fr. (3rd Civ.) 4 Jun. 2003, Bull. Civ. 2003, III, nr. 123, p 110 = JCP N (Semaine juridique
édition notariale et immobilière) 2004, nr. 1269, note M. DAGOT.
98 A.P. SCHOONBROOD-WESSELS, in: Aansprakelijkheid in concernverhoudingen, p 453; P. WÉRY, Droit
des obligations, p 876.
99 C. CAUFMANN (BE), ‘De vertrouwensleer’, in Bijzondere overeenkomsten. Artikelsgewijze
commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, IV. Commentaar Verbintenissenrecht
(Antwerp: Kluwer 16 Feb. 2005), pp 15–18; B. GRIMONPREZ (FR), Rev. Soc. 2009, nr. 11.
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rare situations.100 Even if one thinks of applying this theory, it will be better to
rely on fraud or concealment, as the latter require no proof of the legitimate
confidence in the created situation.
3. English Law
In English law, just as in French and Belgian law, the general principle is that the
legal person only is liable for his debts, while the shareholders benefit from their
limited liability. This principle has since long been established in Salomon v.
Salomon.101
However, exceptions exist to the principle that the corporate veil cannot be
pierced. We will first look at tortious liability, particularly at the decision in
Chandler v. Cape.102 Liability in tort concerns a duty of care of the mother
company and has therefore nothing to do with the grounds for piercing the
corporate veil. It can be referred to as ‘crossing the corporate veil’.103 Afterwards,
we will analyse which grounds to pierce the corporate veil can be relevant when
involuntary creditors, particularly victims in tort, claim damages from the mother
company.
3.1. Tort of Negligence: Breach of a Duty of Care
The equivalent in English law for Articles 1382 and 1383 of the French and
Belgian Civil Code is the tort of negligence. A person is liable in negligence when
(i) he/she owes a duty of care to the victim, (ii) he/she has breached that duty,
(iii) the victim’s damage is not so unforeseeable as to be too remote, and (iv)
there is a causal connection between the careless conduct and the damage.104
Most attention goes to determining whether or not a person owes a duty of care to
another. To establish a duty of care, a three-stage test, also known as the Caparo
test, must be fulfilled. First, the potential for harm has to be foreseeable.105
Second is the proximity requirement. A person can only be entitled to damages if
he/she is ‘so closely and directly affected that [he/she] should be in [the
tortfeasor’s] contemplation’.106 Third, it must be fair, just, and reasonable to
impose a duty of care.107 Especially due to the third condition, it will not be easy
to prove that a mother company owes a duty of care to a person affected by its
100 See, e.g., Cass. fr. 20 May 2014, nr. 12-26.705, 12-26.970 and 12.29.281. It is, for instance, not
sufficient that both companies have the same directors. See Cass. fr. (Com.) 15 Oct. 1974, nr.
73-12391, Rev. Soc. 1975, 495, note Y. GUYON.
101 Salomon v. Salomon [1897] AC 22.
102 Chandler v. Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525.
103 A. SANGER, CLJ 2012, pp 478–481.
104 M. DUGDALE et al., Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (19th edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2006), p 383.
105 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
106 Ibid.; Dorset Yacht Co Ltd. v. Home Office [1970] AC 1004.
107 Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman and Others [1990] 2 AC 605.
402
subsidiary. Courts can take account of all social and public policy implications of
imposing liability.108 However, once the duty of care is established, it is rather
likely that the mother company will be liable. The test set out here will be very
important to establish the liability of the mother company as it is particularly used
to extend liability or to overturn existing limitations on liability, as illustrated in
Chandler v. Cape.109
In common law, a person has no general duty to prevent third parties from
harming others.110 A mother company therefore has no duty to prevent its
subsidiary from harming employees or third parties through its business activities.
However, in Connelly v. RTZ Corp plc. and Lubbe v. Cape, the courts seemed to
hint that the tide could turn. In Connelly, the judge stated that ‘there may […] be
some other person or persons who owe a duty of care to an individual plaintiff
which may be very close to the duty owed by a master to his servant’.111 This
action was, however, time-barred. In Lubbe v. Cape, Lord Bingham of Cornhill
mentioned ‘the responsibility of the defendant as a parent company for ensuring
the observance of proper standards of health and safety by its overseas
subsidiaries’.112 Lubbe v. Cape was settled, so the court did not get a chance to
definitively decide on Cape’s liability in this case.
In Chandler v. Cape, however, the High Court decided that Cape was liable
in tort towards a former employee of its subsidiary, Cape Products, who had been
dissolved before. The former employee, Chandler, worked for Cape Products in
the United Kingdom and not in South Africa as in Lubbe v. Cape. Because of
exposure to asbestos during his work, Chandler suffers from asbestosis 50 years
later. The judge first states that there is no general duty to prevent damage to
another but then cites Smith v. Littlewoods to show that exceptions to this
principle are possible. According to the obiter dictum by Lord Goff in Smith v.
Littlewoods, one of these exceptions is ‘a relationship between the parties which
gives rise to an imposition or assumption of responsibility’ on the part of the
defendant.113 Such a duty of care exists for instance between a main contractor or
architect, on the one side, and the employees of a (sub)contractor, on the other
side.114 Whether there was such an assumption of responsibility by the mother
company is a question of law that falls within the second and third stages of the
108 M. DUGDALE et al., Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, p 392.
109 Ibid., p 401.
110 Smith v. Littlewoods Organisation Ltd. [1987] AC 241, at 270; Chandler v. Cape Plc [2012]
EWCA Civ 525, nr. 63.
111 Connelly v. RTZ Corp Plc [1999] CLC 533, at 538.
112 Lubbe v. Cape Plc, 2000 WL 976033, at 1555F.
113 Smith v. Littlewoods Organisation Ltd., at 272D; Chandler v. Cape Plc, nr. 63.
114 Clay v. A.J. Crump & Sons Ltd. [1964] 1 QB 533; Gray v. Fire Alarm Fabrication Services Ltd.
[2006] ECWA Civ 1496.
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Caparo test.115 Based on the facts, the court found a duty of care of Cape towards
Cape Products’ employees. The Court of Appeal gives an overview of
circumstances that influenced their decision:
(1) the businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the
same; (2) the parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some
relevant aspect of health and safety in the particular industry; (3) the
subsidiary’s system of work is unsafe as the parent company knew, or ought to
have known; and (4) the parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the
subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using that superior knowledge for
the employees’ protection.116
Other factors might be relevant as well and this is just an illustration of
how the Caparo test can be satisfied.117 Several elements are important to assess
the likelihood of such a duty of a mother company in other cases. First, the
emphasis is on what the mother company ought to have known and not on what it
actually knows. This means that the ability to control the subsidiary is important
and not the actual control.118 Second, this case was not considered to be a veil
piercing case. Salomon v. Salomon does not apply to protect the mother company,
and Cape was not liable merely because it is the parent company of another
company but because it owed a duty of care to the employees of its subsidiary.119
As the whole case revolves around the alleged duty of care, corporate social
responsibility statements by the MNE, such as a code of conduct, will help to find
the existence of such a duty. Third, it is not required that the parent company has
full control over its subsidiary before it can be liable.120 According to Hughes,
there should be ‘a practice of intervention in trading operations, coupled with the
utilisation of superior knowledge by a parent company and reliance on this by a
subsidiary’.121 Fourth, the assumption of responsibility need not be voluntarily
done by the mother company.122 Lastly, the cases that are cited, Connelly v. RTZ
and Lubbe v. Cape, involve a subsidiary abroad, so there is no need to restrict the
potential liability in tort towards employees of a British subsidiary only.123
115 Chandler v. Cape Plc, nr. 62 and 64.
116 Ibid., nr. 80.
117 Thompson v. The Renwick Group Plc [2014] EWCA Civ 635, at 33, citing Clerk & Lindsell on
Torts, 20th edn, 3rd Supplement, para. 13-04.
118 E. MCGAUGHEY, ‘Donoghue v. Salomon in the High Court’, J.P.I. Law (Journal of Personal Injury
Law) 2011, nr. 4, p 225; A. SANGER, CLJ 2012, p 480.
119 Chandler v. Cape Plc, nr. 69; E. MCGAUGHEY, J.P.I. Law 2011, nr. 4, p 249.
120 Chandler v. Cape Plc, nr. 66.
121 P. HUGHES, ECLR 2014, p 86.
122 Chandler v. Cape Plc, nr. 64.
123 E. MCGAUGHEY, J.P.I. Law 2011, nr. 4, p 261.
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Adams v. Cape Industries was a 1990 asbestos case where Cape’s liability
was not accepted. Although it involved similar facts and the same defendant,
Chandler v. Cape is perfectly reconcilable with it. While Chandler v. Cape
revolved around a duty of care and the obiter in Smith v. Littlewoods, the
potential existence of a duty of care was never brought up in Adams v. Cape
Industries.124 Chandler v. Cape seems to withstand the judgment of other courts.
The obiter dictum by Lord Goff in Smith v. Littlewoods was approved by the
House of Lords in 2009.125 In Akzo Nobel v. Competition Commission, the
Competition Appeal Tribunal positively referenced to Chandler v. Cape.126
However, this does not mean that all courts give up their reluctance to
hold a mother company liable. In Thompson v. The Renwick Group, the Court of
Appeal recognizes Chandler v. Cape as good law but then distinguishes the case
before it from Chandler v. Cape.127 The facts are, however, utterly similar.
Thompson was exposed to asbestos during his employment and he tries to hold
the mother company, The Renwick Group, liable for his asbestosis.128 The High
Court judge had found liability of the Renwick Group, but this decision is
overturned by the Court of Appeal. The court did not deem the following
elements, among others, sufficient to find a duty of care:129 the appointment of a
director of the subsidiary by the mother company, the increased collaboration
with other companies of the Renwick Group, and the involvement of Renwick in
the day-to-day running and control.130 According to the court, there could be no
duty of care because the businesses of the mother company and the subsidiary
were not, in a relevant respect, the same. This is the first hurdle set out in
Chandler.131 In our opinion, the Court of Appeal seems to require proof that
amounts to evidence allowing the piercing of the corporate veil and mentions that
the proof brought forward by the claimant ‘does not mean that the legal
personality of the subsidiaries separate from that of their ultimate parent was not
retained and respected’.132 The Court also first states that there is no agency
124 S. GRIFFIN, ‘Establishing a Holding Company’s Duty of Care to an Employee of a Subsidiary
without the Need to Lift the Corporate Veil’, Co. L.N. (Company Law Newsletter) 2011, nr. 300,
p 3.
125 Mitchell v. Glasgow City Council [2009] 1 AC 874, at 20 and 56.
126 Akzo Nobel N.V. v. Competition Commission [2013] CAT 13, at 96.
127 V. THOMAS, Rev. Proc. Coll. 2013, pp 29 and 78.
128 His employer, the Arthur Wood Company, no longer existed and did not have in place responsive
liability insurance.
129 S. GRIFFIN, ‘Duty of Care Issues in a Holding-Subsidiary Company Relationship’, Co. L.N. 2014,
(1) 3.
130 Thompson v. The Renwick Group Plc [2014] EWCA Civ 635, at 35.
131 S. GRIFFIN, Co. L.N. 2014, (1) 3.
132 Thompson v. The Renwick Group Plc, at 38.
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relationship between the companies, which would be a ground for piercing the
corporate veil (cf. infra Grounds for Piercing the Corporate Veil).
In all the cases we discussed, the claimant is an employee of a subsidiary.
One can, however, try to use similar arguments in cases in which the damaged
parties are third parties. The case law on employees might be extended to, for
instance, the local population in the host country. It is also argued that on the
basis of Chandler v. Cape, (parents of) transnational companies should owe a duty
of care to the employees of a supplier when there are long-term supply
contracts.133
In the Dutch Shell case,134 Nigerians claimed damages from Royal Dutch
Shell Plc. and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. for oil
leakages that had damaged their property. The Dutch court dismissed the case
against the mother company, Royal Dutch Shell, because even if the company
owed a duty of care to the employees of the subsidiary, it cannot have owed a duty
to the local population. The latter would not fulfil the proximity requirement of
the three-stage test for the existence of a duty of care. The court moreover deems
it not fair, just, and reasonable to impose a duty of care.135 The case is thus
distinguished from Chandler v. Cape.136 The court justifies this by stating that a
duty of care can be owed towards a relatively restricted group, namely employees,
but in this case not towards an ‘almost unrestricted group of people in many
countries’,137 even though Shell had expressed a general CSR commitment.138
Although this case was tried by a Dutch court and thus has no precedent value,
English courts are likely to award attention to the Shell case. This is even so
although Nigerian law, as equated to common law, was actually applicable and not
English common law.139
Some aspects particular to this case might, however, enable courts to
distinguish the Dutch Shell case from other cases in which local population has
suffered damage. The damage to the local population in the Shell case was not
133 A. SANGER, CLJ 2012, pp 480–481.
134 Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage 24 Feb. 2010, Akpan and Vereniging Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch
Shell Plc and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd, www.rechtspraak.nl; Re-
chtbank Den Haag 30 Jan. 2013, Akpan and Vereniging Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc
and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd, www.rechtspraak.nl.
135 Rechtbank Den Haag 30 Jan. 2013, nr. 4.29.
136 Ibid., nr. 4.32.
137 Ibid., nr. 4.29.
138 Ibid., nr. 4.33.
139 The court assimilated Nigerian law with common law. Rechtbank Den Haag 30 Jan. 2013, at
4.22. See L.F.H. ENNEKING, ‘Zorgplichten van multinationals in Nederland’, NJB (Nederlands
Juristenblad) 2013, p 607 and www.navigator.kluwer.nl, 4.
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only due to the breach of a duty of care of the daughter company140 but largely to
sabotage by third parties to which the court attaches great importance.141 Under
common law, the mother or daughter company could be regarded as multiple
tortfeasors together with the saboteurs. This would make them jointly liable and
enable the claimant to sue only one of them.142 Under Nigerian law however, the
oil company in principle bears no liability at all in case of sabotage.143 So
although common law was mostly applied to the case, this specific rule of
Nigerian law might have heavily influenced the outcome.
The court moreover does not generally state that imposing liability on the
mother company for damage to the local population would not be fair, just, and
reasonable. It only states that such liability should be accepted ‘much less fast’
than liability towards employees.144 The court thus seems to require extra strong
evidence, which was in this case not available at all and the sabotage by third
parties was important counterevidence. A case with stronger evidence and/or less
interference by third parties may thus be distinguished from the Dutch Shell case.
3.2. Vicarious Liability
As in French and Belgian laws, a person is, in English law, vicariously liable for
torts committed by his employees. If negligence on the part of the mother
company cannot be proven, it is an option to try to establish its vicarious liability.
There must be a relationship of employer and employee, and the tort must be
committed in the course of the employment.145 The innocence of the employer is
irrelevant and the conditions for liability are interpreted broadly.146 A mother
company might be liable if a director of a subsidiary is, at the same time,
employed by the mother company. A director can be a de jure director, a de facto
director, or a shadow director. A de facto director is someone who performs
management functions that are ordinarily performed by and associated with a
formally appointed director.147 According to the Companies Act 2006, a shadow
director is ‘a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the
140 The court determined that the daughter company had breached a duty of care when the oil
leakages arose; see Rechtbank Den Haag 30 Jan. 2013, nr. 4.38-4.46.
141 Sabotage is often committed in order to steal oil or to receive damages from oil companies for the
oil pollution; see Rechtbank Den Haag 30 Jan. 2013, nr. 2.1.
142 M. LUNNEY & K. OLIPHANT, Tort Law. Text and Materials (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University
Press 2008) pp 265–266.
143 Rechtbank Den Haag 30 Jan. 2013, nr. 4.18.
144 Ibid., 4.29.
145 M. DUGDALE et al., Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, pp 321 and 334.
146 Ibid., pp 334 and 337.
147 S. GRIFFIN, ‘Establishing the Liability of a Director of a Corporate Director: Issues Relevant to
Disturbing Corporate Personality’, Comp. Law 2013, nr. 34(5), p 136. There is no clear test to
determine whether someone is a de facto director.
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directors of the company are accustomed to act’.148 So far, there are no cases
reported on vicarious liability as a ground to establish the liability of a mother
company.
3.3. Grounds for Piercing the Corporate Veil
In English law, the grounds for piercing the corporate veil are more clearly
determined by statutes and case law than in French and Belgian law. Very few,
however, seem to be relevant to hold a mother company liable towards an
involuntary creditor. We have examined all potential grounds for piercing the
corporate veil but will only retain the ones that might form some basis to establish
liability.149 We must be aware that the corporate veil is only pierced in rare cases
in favour of voluntary creditors.150 ‘Voluntary creditors’ have chosen to contract
with the company and have thus knowingly and willingly become a creditor, as
opposed to the ‘involuntary creditors’.151 The courts are even more reluctant to
pierce on judicial grounds than on the basis of a statute and only the judicial
grounds can serve involuntary creditors.152
One ground for piercing that might be helpful is when a company is used
as mere façade or sham to hide the activities of another person.153 It is especially
interesting that piercing will be allowed ‘when companies are used for the
avoidance of existing liabilities’.154 Unfortunately, it is still unclear when a
company is a mere façade.155 The intention to hide unlawful activities is relevant
and piercing will only be possible when hiding was the common intention of all
parties involved.156 Although this piercing ground is usually applied to the benefit
of contractual creditors, nothing seems to prevent applying this ground to
involuntary creditors. Even if this is not accepted, this piercing ground can be
148 Companies Act 2006, s. 251(1).
149 We have thus examined but will not discuss the following grounds for piercing the corporate veil:
fraudulent and wrongful trading, abuse of company name, breach of a director’s duty of care and
skill and his fiduciary duties, and agency.
150 P.L. DAVIES & S. WORTHINGTON, Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell
2012), p 223; K. VANDEKERCKHOVE, Piercing the Corporate Veil, p 75.
151 Employees should normally be considered as voluntary creditors, but due to the need to make a
living and the power of MNEs, the choice to contract or not is often illusory.
152 Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries [1940] AC 1014; P.L. DAVIES & S. WORTHINGTON,
Principles of Modern Company Law, p 217.
153 P.L. DAVIES & S. WORTHINGTON, Principles of Modern Company Law, p 219.
154 Kensington International Ltd. v. Congo [2005] EWHC 2684 (Comm); K. VANDEKERCKHOVE,
Piercing the Corporate Veil, p 71.
155 Adams v. Cape Industries Plc, at 543D; P.L. DAVIES & S. WORTHINGTON, Principles of Modern
Company Law, p 219.
156 Adams v. Cape Industries Plc, at 540D; C. HO THAM, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil: Searching for
Appropriate Choice of Law Rules’, LMCLQ (Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly)
2007, p (22) 33.
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turned into a strong argument to allow the liability in tort of a mother company.
When contractual creditors are protected against a company that was deliberately
founded to hide unlawful activities, involuntary creditors should definitely be
allowed to receive damages from the person behind the corporate construction.
In Adams v. Cape Industries, it was argued that the subsidiaries were a
mere façade for Cape’s activities. The House of Lords acknowledged this, but
liability was not accepted because there was nothing illegal in Cape ‘arranging its
affairs’.157 According to this case, liability would be possible when the corporate
structure is used to evade ‘(i) limitations imposed on his conduct by law, [or] (ii)
such rights of relief against him as third parties already possess’.158 However,
liability will not be incurred when the corporate structure is used to evade ‘such
rights of relief as third parties may in the future acquire’.159 The exclusion of the
latter might hinder the liability of the mother company towards involuntary
creditors who still have to establish the debt of the subsidiary.
Three other grounds for piercing the corporate veil were advanced in
Adams v. Cape Industries, but none of these were withheld as a possibility by the
court. The Court of Appeal reacted to the single economic unit argument by
emphasizing that ‘there is no general principle that all companies in a group of
companies are to be regarded as one’.160 Only when the interpretation of a
statutory or contractual provision is at stake, there might be a chance of success
with this argument.161 Interests of justice are neither a ground for piercing.162
This notion is very vague, so even if it was accepted, it would not be clear when
piercing should be allowed. Impropriety was, in Adams v. Cape Industries, only
discussed in relation to the argument that the company was used as mere façade
or sham, but it can also be seen as a potential autonomous piercing ground.
Davies argues that piercing should be allowed when a company is used to carry on
an unlawful activity.163 In VTB, impropriety was rejected as a piercing ground.164
4. Competition Law
Competition law provides the most flexible and broad approach to corporate veil
piercing because the authorities look at the unity of conduct on the market and
157 Adams v. Cape Industries Plc, at 544C.
158 Ibid., at 544C.
159 Ibid., at 544D.
160 Adams v. Cape Industries Plc, at 532D.
161 P.L. DAVIES & S. WORTHINGTON, Principles of Modern Company Law, p 219; K. VANDEKERCKHOVE,
Piercing the Corporate Veil, p 72.
162 Adams v. Cape Industries Plc, at 536.
163 P.L. DAVIES & S. WORTHINGTON, Principles of Modern Company Law, p 221.
164 VTB Capital Plc v. Nutritek International Corpn and others, at 128.
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the formal separation between two legal entities has no importance.165 As the
victim of a competition infringement is not easy to find and will not claim
damages for the insecure loss it has suffered, the EU Commission steps in to
protect the consumers and other players on the market. In this way, the problems
of informational asymmetries, legal costs, risk, and procedural hurdles are
acknowledged.166 As the economic unity argument also comes up in French,167
Belgian168 and English169 law – although it has not (yet) been accepted – we will
take a look at competition law.
For the application of Articles 101 and 102 Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU), an undertaking is ‘any entity engaged in an
economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is
financed’.170 The corporate veil can be pierced whenever companies form a single
economic unit.171 In order to facilitate the proof that several legal entities form
one single economic unit, the competition authority can rely on the following
presumption: a parent company is presumed to exercise actual decisive influence
over a subsidiary when the parent company holds (almost) all the capital in the
subsidiary or when the parent company holds all the capital in an interposed
company and the latter holds the entire capital of the subsidiary.172 The
presumption was, for instance, applied to hold the investment firm Goldman
Sachs jointly liable for the infringement of competition law by producers of
high-voltage power cables.173 The presumption is rebuttable by the company
because there must be a balance between reaching the goals of competition law,
165 V. ROSE & D. BAILEY, Bellamy & Child – European Union Law of Competition (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), p 94.
166 P. HUGHES, ECLR 2014, p 70.
167 Cass. fr. (Com.) 20 Oct. 1992, Rev. Soc. 1993, p 449; A. DANIS-FATÔME, Apparence et contrat
(Paris: L.G.D.J. 2004), p 329; B. GRIMONPREZ, Rev. Soc. 2009, nr. 17.
168 Articles 3 and 4 of the Belgian Competition Law (Law of 10 Jun. 2006) correspond to Arts 101
and 102 TFEU. It has the same interpretation of the concept ‘undertaking’. See F. TUYTSCHAEVER
& M. VISSER, ‘Commentaar bij art. 1 WBEM’, 1 juli 2007, www.jura.be.
169 Adams v. Cape Industries Plc, at 532D; P. HUGHES, ECLR 2014, p 68.
170 ECJ 10 Sep. 2009, Akzo Nobel, C-97/08 P, at 54.
171 ECJ 8 May 2013, Eni SpA, C-508/11 P, at 46. Piercing the corporate veil is not only relevant to
hold the mother company liable for the subsidiary’s debt but also to calculate the amount of
turnover generated by the infringing undertaking and to determine the jurisdiction of national
courts.
172 ECJ C-97/08 P, Akzo Nobel, at 60; ECJ C-508/11 P, Eni SpA, at 47–48. For more case laws on
this matter, see M. VAN DER WOUDE et al., EU Competition Law Handbook 2013 Edition
(London: Sweet & Maxwell 2012), pp 37–40.
173 Press release of the European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines producers of high
voltage power cables EUR 302 million for operating a cartel’, 2 Apr. 2014, http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-14-358_en.htm.
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namely penalizing and prevention, and the presumption of innocence, legal
certainty, and rights of the defence.174
The presumption does not apply when the subsidiary is not, directly or via
an interposed company, wholly owned by the parent company. In that case and
when the presumption is rebutted, the competition authority has to prove that the
parent company has a decisive influence over the subsidiary.175 The European
Commission has, for instance, in several cases proven that a joint venture and the
two companies behind it, form a single economic unit.176 Not only the conduct of
the subsidiary on the market will serve as proof but also ‘the economic,
organisational and legal links which unite [the] legal entities’ are of particular
importance.177 There is no exhaustive list of factors that are relevant to determine
the existence of a single economic unit, as all factors establishing a link between
the subsidiary and the parent company matter.178
In competition law, it is acknowledged that there are ‘limits to the
externalization of risks through the use of limited liability’179 so the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) interprets the provisions in a flexible way, in favour of
finding economic unity.180 It is not required that the parent company has explicit
knowledge of the underlying illegality.181 Because of this expansive view,
companies are aware of the fact that they should establish a competition policy
throughout the group and make sure it is implemented.182
5. Conclusion
In French, Belgian, and English laws, the general tortious provisions, namely
Article 1382 Civil Code and the tort of negligence, are the most important to
establish the liability of the mother company. Especially in English law, the tort of
negligence is being developed as to increasingly impose a duty of care on mother
174 ECJ C-508/11 P, Eni SpA, at 50. So far, the ECJ has never found a violation of the fundamental
rights of a corporation. This induces some to argue that the presumption is, in fact, not
rebuttable. See B. LEUPOLD, ‘Effective Enforcement of EU Competition Law Gone Too Far?
Recent Case Law on the Presumption of Parental Liability’, ECLR 2013, nr. 34(11), pp 571 and
578; M. OLAERTS & C. CAUFMANN, ‘Quimica: Further Developing the Rules on Parent Company
Liability’, ECLR 2011, nr. 32(9), p 439.
175 ECJ 26 Sep. 2013, Alliance One International Inc., C-679/11 P, at 40; ECJ 26 Sep. 2013, The
Dow Chemical Company, C-179/12 P, at 56; B. LEUPOLD, ECLR 2013, nr. 34(11), p 571.
176 ECJ C-179/12 P, The Dow Chemical Company, at 58; ECJ 26 Sep. 2013, EI du Pont de Nemours
and Company, C-172/12 P, at 47.
177 ECJ C-97/08 P, Akzo Nobel, at 73–74; ECJ C-508/11 P, Eni SpA, at 46; ECJ C-179/12 P, The
Dow Chemical Company, at 52.
178 ECJ C-97/08 P, Akzo Nobel, at 74; ECJ C-179/12 P, The Dow Chemical Company, at 54.
179 P. HUGHES, ECLR 2014, p 76.
180 B. LEUPOLD, ECLR 2013, nr. 34(11), p 573.
181 P. HUGHES, ECLR 2014, p 69.
182 Ibid., p 68; M. OLAERTS & C. CAUFMANN, ECLR 2011, nr. 32(9), p 439.
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companies. This evolution will also be helpful to direct defendant companies to a
settlement, as has been done in a number of corporate social responsibility
cases.183 Another possibility to hold the mother company directly liable is
vicarious liability. When a director of a subsidiary is, at the same time, employed
by the mother company, the mother company will be liable for the acts of its
employee. In French law, there might be a general vicarious liability at hand of a
mother company for its subsidiaries as suggested in the projet Catala. There
definitely is a promising trend to hold mother companies liable in French
environmental law.184
The liability of the mother company can also be put at stake by establishing
the debt of the subsidiary and finding a way to hold the mother company liable for
this debt. We have referred to this as ‘indirect liability’. The law is very shattered
on ways in which involuntary creditors can hold the mother company liable for the
subsidiary’s debt. In French and Belgian laws, this is possible by proving abuse of
right, fraud, concealment, or the creation of false appearances, which are all
based on similar indications. Because of the unsettled nature of the law, there is
an important possibility to guide the judge. In a case of 1994 for instance, the
Belgian judge relied on concealment, abuse of right, and the adage fraus omnia
corrumpit all at the same time in order to allow the piercing of the corporate
veil.185 English company law has established several grounds to pierce the
corporate veil, but few seem fit to apply to involuntary creditors. Only when
the subsidiary is used as a mere façade or sham, veil piercing seems possible. We
must say that in English, Belgian, and French laws alike, it is not likely that
the corporate veil will be pierced when we deal with an MNE that has a
good-working administration and an at least theoretically clear division between
the different legal persons. Establishing the liability of the mother company itself,
without using the subsidiary as an intermediary, yields therefore more chances.
It is only in competition law that the conduct on the market as a single
economic unit generally prevails over the legal separation between companies. In
insolvency law, another law that is often concerned with veil piercing issues, it is
much more difficult to extend the insolvency proceedings to the mother
company.186 This shows that regard must be had to the particular situation of
involuntary creditors, such as the victims of a competition law infringement.
183 A settlement was reached in Lubbe v. Cape Plc, 2000 WL 976033, in Ngcobo v. Thor Chemicals
Holdings Ltd., 1995 WL 1082070 and in the similar case Sithole v. Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd.
[1999] TLR 110. See C. BUGGENHOUDT & S. COLMANT, Justice in a Globalised Economy: A
Challenge for Lawyers – Corporate Responsibility and Accountability in European Courts (March
2011), http://www.asf.be/blog/publications/gandj_craeuropeancourts/.
184 According to Art. L512-17 of the environmental code (loi Grenelle II), the mother company is
liable for environmental damage when the subsidiary is undercapitalized.
185 Court of Appeal Antwerp 1 Feb. 1994, TRV 1996, 64.
186 See, e.g., ECJ 15 Dec. 2011, Rastelli Davide, C-191/10.
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Insolvency proceedings, on the contrary, typically involve more voluntary than
involuntary creditors. This difference also makes sense if we look at the
consequences of piercing the corporate veil in both situations. When the
corporate veil is pierced in competition law, the economic unit is only liable for
the imposed fine and possibly for the tort liability that is incurred. This is
comparable to liability in tort for a certain act, towards certain victims. In
insolvency law, however, piercing the corporate veil has more drastic
consequences, as all contractual creditors will claim payment from the mother
company.187 Considering the consequences and the position of the creditors, it is
obvious that the law should differentiate between veil piercing by voluntary
creditors and by involuntary creditors. National laws should follow the example
and differentiate between liability of a mother company towards contractual
creditors in insolvency proceedings and liability towards employees and the local
population of the host country of a subsidiary.
The corporate social responsibility cases we have discussed reveal the
potential of private law for the protection of victims against the practices of
MNEs. This can bring the discussion on the ‘social mission’ of these law domains
to the surface,188 while we see that an evolution to more protection is already
taking place. The analysis has shown that the elements for better protection are
there. It will be interesting to see whether courts manage to differentiate properly
between the involuntary creditors of MNEs, possibly victims of human rights
violations, and the voluntary contractual creditors for whom more stringent rules
can apply.
187 B. GRIMONPREZ, Rev. Soc. 2009, nr. 9.
188 U. BAXI, ‘Mass Torts, Multinational Enterprise Liability and Private International Law’, Rec.Cours
(Académie de Droit International. Recueil des cours) 1999, nr. 276, p 319.
413
List of Contributors
ANDRE JANSSEN
(editor)
FLORIAN FAUST
Professor of Law, Bucerius Law School,
Hamburg, Germany
Bucerius Law School
Jungiusstraße 620355 Hamburg
Germany
Tel.: +49 40 307 06 194
E-mail: florian.faust@law-school.de
MICHEL CANNARSA
Associate Professor, Catholic
University of Lyon Faculty of Law,
France
Université Catholique de Lyon Faculté
de Droit
23, place Carnot
69286 Lyon Cedex 02
France
Tel.: +33 4 72 32 58 99
E-mail: mcannarsa@univ-catholyon.fr
FRANCESCO PAOLO PATTI
Post-doctoral Research Fellow,
Department of Law, University of
Roma Tre, Italy
Facoltà di Giurisprudenza
Università degli studi di Roma III
Via Tacito, 41
00165 Roma
Italy
E-mail:
francescopaolopatti@gmail.com
LARRY DIMATTEO
Huber Hurst Professor of Contract
Law; Affiliate Professor, Center for
European Studies, at the University of
Florida, USA
University of Florida,Warrington
College of Business Administration
Department of Management PO Box
117165237 STZ Gainesville, Florida
USA
Tel.: +1 352 392 0323
E-mail:
larry.dimatteo@warrington.ufl.edu
BARBARA PASA
Associate Professor in Comparative
Law, Department of Law, University of
Turin, Italy
Università degli Studi di Torino
Via Verdi, 8
10124 Torino
Italy
Tel.: +39 11-6703463
E-mail: barbara.pasa@unito.it
SIEL DEMEYERE
PhD researcher at KU Leuven and
Université Lille 2
KU Leuven
Faculty of Law
Institute for Property Law Tiensestraat
41 3000 Leuven
Belgium
Tel.: + 32 56 24 62 89
E-mail:
siel.demeyere@kuleuven-kulak.be
PETER ROTT
Professor of Civil Law, European
Private Law and Consumer Law at the
University of Kassel, Germany
Institut für Wirtschaftsrecht am FB 07
Fachgebiet Bürgerliches Recht,
Europäisches Privatrecht und
Verbraucherrecht Nora-Platiel-Str.
434109 Kassel
European Review of Private Law 3-2015 [479–480] ©Kluwer Law International BV. Printed in Great Britain.
479
Germany
Tel.: +49 561 804-7304
E-mail: rott@uni-kassel.de
VIBE ULFBECK
Professor of Private Law at the Centre
for Enterprise Liability (CEVIA),
Faculty of Law, University of
Copenhagen, Denmark
JUR Center for virksomhedsansvar
Studiestræde 6, 1455 København K,
Studiegården, 4. sal, Building: 02-4-17,
1455 København K
Denmark
Tel.: +45 35 32 31 48
E-mail: Vibe.Ulfbeck@jur.ku.dk
ERVELINE RAMAEKERS
Assistant Professor and Fellow by
Special Election in Law, Wadham
College, Oxford, UK
Wadham College Oxford, OX1 3PN
United Kingdom
Tel.: +44 1865 277900
E-mail:
eveline.ramaekers@wadh.ox.ac.uk
JULES STUYCK
Emeritus professor KU leuven, partner
Liedekerke, Brussels
Liedekerke Wolters Waelbroeck
Kirkpatrick boulevard de l’Empereur 3
Keizerslaan
1000 Brussels
Belgium
Tel.: +32 2 551 16 94
E-mail: j.stuyck@liedekerke.com
JACQUES HERBOTS
Professor emeritus of the Catholic
University of Leuven
Prof. Dr. Jacques H. Herbots
Olmendreef 13
3210 Linden
Belgium
Tel.: +32 16 622759
E-mail: jherbots2012@yahoo.com
480
european review of private law 
revue européenne de droit privé
europäische zeitschrift für privatrecht
Guidelines for authors
The European Review of Private Law aims to provide a forum which facilitates the  development of 
European Private Law. It publishes work of interest to academics and practitioners across 
European boundaries. Comparative work in any fi eld of private law is welcomed. The journal 
deals especially with comparative case law. Work focusing on one jurisdiction alone is accepted, 
 provided it has a strong cross-border interest.
The Review requires the submission of manuscripts by e-mail attachment, preferably in Word. 
Please do not forget to add your complete mailing address, telephone number, fax number and/or 
e-mail address when you submit your manuscript.
Manuscripts should be written in standard English, French or German.
Directives pour les Auteurs
La Revue européenne de droit privé a pour objectif de faciliter, par la constitution d’un forum, la 
mise au point d’un Droit Privé Européen. Elle publie des articles susceptibles d’intéresser aussi 
bien l’universitaire que le praticien, sur un plan européen. Nous serons heureux d’ouvrir nos 
pages aux travaux comparatifs dans tout domaine du droit privé. La Revue est consacrée en 
particulier á l’étude comparée de la jurisprudence. Les travaux concentrés sur une seule juridic-
tion sont admissibles, à condition de présenter un intérêt dépassant les frontières.
Nous souhaitons recevoir les textes par courrier électronique, de préférence en Word. Ajoutez 
l’adresse postale compléte et le numéro de téléphone de l’auteur, un numéro de télécopie et 
l’adresse électronique.
Les textes doivent être rédigés en langue anglaise, française ou allemande standard.
Leitfaden für Autoren
Die Europäische Zeitschrift für Privatrecht will ein Forum bieten, um die Entwicklung des 
 europäischen Zivilrechts zu fördern. Sie veröffentlicht Arbeiten, die für Akademiker und Juristen 
in ganz Europa grenzüberschreitend von Interesse sind. Vergleichende Untersuchungen aus 
jedem Bereich des Zivilrechts sind willkommen. Die Zeitschrift befasst sich insbesondere mit 
 vergleichender Rechtsprechung. Artikel, die sich auf ein einziges Hoheitsgebiet konzentrieren, 
 können angenommen werden, wenn sie von besonderem grenzüberschreitenden .dnisesseretnI
Wir möchten ihre Beiträge per E-Mail erhalten und bevorzugen Dateien in Word. Bitte geben Sie 
ihre Anschrift, Telefonnummer, Telefaxnummer und/oder E-Mailadresse an. 
Manuskripte sind in korrektem Englisch, Französisch oder Deutsch zu verfassen.
Style guide
A style guide for contributors can be found in online at http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/
europeanreviewofprivatelaw.
Index
An annual index will be published in issue No. 6 of each volume.
european review of private law 
revue européenne de droit privé
europäische zeitschrift für privatrecht
Contact
Jessy Emaus, e-mail:   erpl@kluwerlaw.com
Editors
E.H. Hondius, Universiteit Utrecht, Molengraaff Instituut voor Privaatrecht, 
The Netherlands. 
M.E. Storme, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
Editorial Board
W. Cairns, Manchester Metropolitan University, England, U.K.; Florence G’Sell-Macrez,  Université 
de Lorraine, France; J.F. Gerkens, Université de Liège, Belgium ; A. Janssen, Westfälische
Wilhelms- Universität Münster, Germany; R. Jox, Katholische Hochschule Nordrhein-Westfalen,
Abteilung Köln, Germany; D. Ross Macdonald, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, U.K.; M. Martín-Casals,
Universitat de Girona, Catalunya, Spain; B. Pozzo, Università dell’Insubria-Como, Italy; S. Whittaker,
St. John’s College, Oxford University, Oxford, England, U.K.    
Advisory Board
E. Baginska, Uniwersytet Gdanski, Gdansk, Poland; C. von Bar, European Legal Studies Institute/Institut für
Europäische Rechtswissenschaft, Universität Osnabrück, Germany; H. Beale, University of  Warwick, England,
U.K.; R. Clark, Faculty of Law, University College Dublin, Republic of Ireland; F. Ferrari, Università
degli Studi di Verona, Italy; A. Gambaro, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy; G. Garcia Cantero,
Departamento de derecho privado, Universidad de Zaragoza, Aragon, Spain; J. Ghestin, Université
de Paris, France; M. Hesselink, Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands; C. Jamin,  Ecole de droit
de Sciences Po, Paris, France; K.D. Kerameus, Ethniko kai kapodistriako Panepistimio Athinon, Athinai, Greece;
H. Kötz, Bucerius Law School, Hamburg, Germany; O. Lando, Juridisk Institut Handelshojskolen
Copenhagen, Denmark; Kåre Lilleholt, Universitetet i Oslo, Institutt for privatrett, Oslo, Norway;
B. Lurger, Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Austria; H.L. MacQueen, School of Law, University
of Edinburgh, Scotland, U.K.; B.S. Markesinis, University College London,  England, U.K./University
of  Texas, Austin, Texas, U.S.A.; V. Mikelenas, Teises Fakultetas, Vilniaus Universiteto, Lithuania; 
A. Pinto Monteiro, Universidade de Coimbra, Faculdade de direito, Portugal; C. Ramberg, Stockholms
universitet, Sweden; R. Sacco, Università degli Studi di Torino, Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Italy;
D. Spielmann, European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France; L. Tichy, Univerzita Karlova,
Praha, the Czech Republic; F. Werro, Faculté de droit, Université de Fribourg, Switzerland;
T. Wilhelmsson, Helsingen Yliopisto, Finland.
Founded in 1992 by Ewoud Hondius and Marcel Storme
ISSN 0928-9801 
All Rights Reserved. ©2015 Kluwer Law International
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilised in any form or 
by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information 
storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. 
Typeface ITC Bodoni Twelve
Design Dingoj | Peter Oosterhout, Diemen-Amsterdam
Printed and Bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY.
